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Customer retention is declining among frozen-seafood customers exporting to the USA & Canada

A business diagnosis for TAMYCO Logistics: from the symptom (CRR in free fall), to the core problem — a narrow service portfolio — its root cause and a solution roadmap built around joining the WCA alliance.

AuthorLê Nguyễn Tùng Dương
Student ID22107324
SupervisorProf. Quan Tran
MethodQualitative · Tableau
10,825 TEU
Total volume handled, 2020–2022
414
Total customers, 2020–2022
77% 36%
All-market CRR drop between periods
70% 28%
USA–Canada CRR (period 21–22)
Part I · Background

Industry context, the company & market share

TAMYCO (TAM MY IMPORT EXPORT CO., LTD) is a logistics provider specialising in the reefer (refrigerated container) niche for seafood and fruit. Formerly GS Logistics, it brings more than 10 years of experience.

Vietnam ranks 11th of 50 emerging logistics markets (Agility 2022), with a forecast CAGR of 5.5% over 2022–2027. More than 43,000 logistics firms operate, yet up to 90% are SMEs capitalised below VND 10 billion. TAMYCO has 20 staff across 5 departments: Sales, OPS, CS, Pricing and internal functions.

Reefer accounts for roughly 20% of container exports to the USA. Seeing the potential, TAMYCO concentrated its reefer services on seafood and fruit; today 70% of customers come from frozen cargo. Revenue reached VND 140 billion in 2021 (EBIT 21 billion) and VND 200 billion in 2022 (EBIT 40 billion) — profit comes mainly from the freight margin (about 10% of input price).

Dashboard 01 · Market Share Market share & volume handled, 2020–2022 Source: TAMYCO data & Tableau visualization
10,825 TEU
Total volume, 3 years
55.5%
TEU to USA–Canada
≈70% of profit
414
Total customers
97
Frozen-seafood customers
≈35% of the niche
Top 10 markets: USA–Canada, Japan, China, UAE, Australia, Germany, UK, Maldives, France, Israel. Freight rates to USA–Canada run about 1.5× those to the EU and 3–6× Asian markets → the largest margin.
Part I · Symptom

Symptom: customer retention in free fall

While the logistics industry boomed in 2020–2022, TAMYCO failed to ride the wave. CRR is calculated as CRR = ((E − N) / S) × 100 (S: start of period, E: end of period, N: new customers).

All-market: CRR fell sharply from 77.1% (2020–2021) to 35.8% (2021–2022). In the USA–Canada market specifically — which delivers most of the profit — CRR sits below the service-industry average (67%), collapsing from 69.95% to 28.4%. The frozen-seafood segment dropped from ~79% to ~43%.

Dashboard 02 · Retention CRR by segment & period — interactive filter Table 1 & Table 3 · TAMYCO Sales data
Market
CRR 2020–2021 CRR 2021–2022 Service-industry threshold 67%

Customer cohorts: who stays, who leaves?

From Dashboard 5 (Appendix 1) with the colour code red = 1 year, gold = 2 consecutive years, green = 3 consecutive years. Churn surged in the 2021–2022 period.

Dashboard 03 · Cohort Flow Customer flow across each transition period Appendix 1 · Dashboard 5 (Tableau)
Retained (loyal) New customers (new) Churned (churned)
2020–2021: 212 loyal customers, 81 new, 63 churned. 2021–2022: only 107 retained, 86 new, but 186 churned — nearly 3× the previous period.
◇ Analytical focus

The frozen-seafood segment exporting to USA–Canada via reefer containers was chosen as the focus: it contributes the highest profit and the largest number of accounts, yet shows the most severe CRR decline. In 2022 the company lost 102 customers in total, including 25 in seafood alone.

Part I · Problems Identified

Four potential problem areas

From the "problem mess" gathered through stakeholder interviews (Appendix 2), four prominent problems were grouped. The Appendix 3 survey (10 respondents, 1–5 scale) quantifies the level of agreement.

P1
Ocean freight higher than rivals

3 of 4 customers feel TAMYCO’s rates sit above the market. The US lane runs mainly on CMA CGM & Evergreen — pricing is unattractive.

Survey score "High prices"3.6 / 5
P2
Unprofessional sales team

2 of 4 customers find sales slow to respond and prone to misquoting (forgetting AMS surcharges, VAT). Trust in sales is tied to trust in the company.

Survey score "Unprofessional sales"3.5 / 5
P3
Too few services offered

Few shipping lines (CMA, EMC, ONE), missing value-added services (trucking, insurance, FOB agency). Concentrating resources on a handful of lines erodes competitiveness.

Survey score "Few service (shipping line)"4.9 / 5
P4
Low reputation raises capability doubts

No alliance membership, no FMC Bond. FOB is just 215 of 10,825 TEU (~2%) versus the 20–30% industry norm. Customers hesitate to entrust high-value shipments.

Survey score "Low reputation"4.3 / 5
Dashboard 04 · Problem Survey Heatmap: agreement level per problem Appendix 3 · 10 respondents · 1–5 scale

Click any problem cell to highlight it on the average chart below. The deeper the teal, the stronger the agreement.

The three highest-rated problems — Few shipping-line services (4.9), Slow response time (4.8), Few third-party services (4.7) — all trace back to one root: an overly narrow service portfolio.
Part II · Main Problem Justification

Main problem: a narrow service portfolio

"Low reputation" is only the visible consequence. At the core lies an impoverished product–service portfolio: missing value-added services, few lanes, few shipping-line and third-party partners.

The USA–Canada lane can only be booked through CMA CGM – Evergreen – ZIM (lines with loose policies that don’t require an FMC Bond). This dependence has grown year on year. Drilling into TEU volume by carrier, CMA CGM supplies nearly 80% of TAMYCO’s capacity — an alarming risk concentration.

Dashboard 05 · Carrier Dependency Carrier dependence & market position TAMYCO data · Statista · Alphaliner 2023
View
CMA CGM carries ~80% of volume. Yet CMA CGM’s reefer capacity is no stronger than Maersk, MSC or COSCO — meaning TAMYCO is missing stronger carriers for the US lane.

On service usage, most customers buy only Ocean Freight; value-added services (customs clearance, trucking, insurance, agency) are barely used — even though the company owns its own truck fleet. FOB makes up just ~2% of total TEU, far below the industry norm.

▲ Main-problem definition

"An impoverished portfolio of products offered to customers" — from missing add-on services (trucking, insurance, agency, import handling…) to weak relationship-building capability across different shipping lines. With no Pricing team, no one manages the product portfolio.

Part II · Existence & Importance

Justifying the problem through a satisfaction survey

A survey of 10 customers (8 long-standing + 2 new), 1–10 scale, measuring satisfaction as the "delta between expectation and experience." Falling CRR is itself evidence that satisfaction is troubled.

Dashboard 06 · Satisfaction Satisfaction across 10 criteria — interactive radar Appendix 4 · 10 customers · 1–10 scale
Compare a customer
The lowest scores land on criteria about the range of services & carriers (Q1: 5.1), value-added services (Q2: 5.9), enough lanes for future plans (Q9: 6.0) and the number of carriers on the USA–Canada lane (Q5: 6.1) — exactly the "narrow service portfolio." By contrast, customer service during & after orders (Q7: 7.8, Q8: 7.9) is rated well.
◇ Importance

According to Oláh et al., diversifying the service portfolio (by profit) correlates positively with firm flexibility and operational capability. Hartmann likewise shows that "collaboration" with carriers/third parties strongly affects loyalty. Retaining existing customers costs far less than acquiring new ones (Ahmad & Buttle).

Part III · Causes Validation

Validating the root causes

Interviews with 6 experts (ports, carriers, competitors) point to 4 potential causes behind the narrow service portfolio.

C1
Lack of value-added services

Missing trucking, customs, insurance, import handling, LCL — a reliable local service network is a success factor (Sheng Teng Huang).

C2
No global agents for every lane

Door-to-door customers need partners in the destination country. Without international links, there’s no way to share a contract number for better rates.

C3
No FMC Bond for the USA–Canada lane

MSC, Maersk, ONE, OOCL and Hapag-Lloyd all require an FMC Bond to issue a valid HBL and sign freight-supply contracts.

C4
No Pricing team

Rate requests scattered across many people, with no systematic data → poor price comparison, slow responses, and missed carrier priorities.

✕ Validated core cause

A lack of service resources from shipping lines. Ocean freight is every forwarder’s core product; TAMYCO acts as agent for only 2 lines on the US route (a slight +10 TEU in 2022 thanks to ZIM). The deepest root is the absence of an FMC Bond — the barrier to partnering with major carriers.

"Concentrating too much on 1–2 carriers can be fine at times, but long-term it’s a weakness — you only exploit a few strong lanes of that line, especially for USA–Canada where rates and lane strength shift constantly between carriers."— Mr. Phillip Le · Deputy General Director, SP-ITC Port
Part IV · Solutions

Solutions: from Pricing & FMC Bond to the WCA alliance

Two feasible solutions and one main solution, chosen on the basis of data, research and expert interviews.

✦ Solution 1 · Build / restructure a Pricing team

A unit bridging all relationships between the company and carriers, truckers and agencies. It centralises rate & service updates, negotiates on the spot and maintains relationships. Cost ~VND 15 million/month (≈USD 700) — achievable by restructuring existing staff. This is a short-term "firefighting" measure.

~USD 700/monthB2B bridgeRate-portfolio governance
✦ Solution 2 · Obtain an FMC Bond to expand market share

It addresses both the inbound side (partnering with major carriers) and the outbound side (FOB handling, co-loading, sharing contract numbers, holding the MBL + issuing the HBL). The FMC also offers protection via CADRS. Cost: USD 1,000 service fee + USD 6,000 insurance.

USD 1,000 service feeUSD 6,000 insuranceUnlocks major carriers
★ Main solution · Join the WCA alliance (WCA Inter Global)

WCA unlocks global connectivity, uses co-loaders to broaden the carrier portfolio in the short term, raises reputation, and serves as a priority springboard for obtaining an FMC Bond. Maintenance fee ~USD 5,000/year (VND 110 million). It needs at least 60–100 FOB / import-handling shipments (profit USD 50–100 each) to break even.

~USD 5,000/yearGlobal co-loadersSpringboard to FMC BondBuilds reputation
"Joining major international associations, WCA especially, delivers a lot of short-term value… The first requirement is transparent finances, accounting and systems. Fees run USD 2,000–3,000/year; each import/FOB shipment earns ~USD 50, so you need at least 500–600 shipments to reach break-even."— Mr. Alex Tran Chi Dung · Vice President, VILAS
Part V · Action Plan

Action plan & implementation roadmap

A set of actions spanning Jan 2024 → Jan 2025, split into 3 streams: Back Office preparation, Front Office restructuring, and the WCA Inter Global application.

Dashboard 07 · Roadmap Gantt Detailed timeline by task & owner Detailed planning & timeline · TAMYCO
Back Office Front Office Apply WCA

Organisational restructuring

The old structure split Sales only into Import/Export. The new structure separates Domestic Sales & International Sales, and adds a Pricing department that consolidates rates from every source (domestic carriers, third parties, global logistics agents).

Old structure

General Manager
Import Sales
Export Sales
CS (2 branches)
OPS
HR
Finance

New structure (post-WCA)

General Manager
★ Pricing (consolidates domestic rates + global agency)
Domestic Sales
International Sales
CS (restructured)
OPS (expanded services)
HR
Finance (intl. payments)
◇ Communication

The change affects only the Pricing function (working centrally with every carrier in Vietnam). Announce it when the Pricing department is established (Oct 2024). After joining WCA, use membership benefits to apply for an FMC Bond (expected 2025) and inform partners.

Part VI · Supporting Information

Business model & research methodology

TAMYCO positions its core values around C-TRUST (Customer commitment, Transparency, Respect, Unity, Sustainability, Transformation) and a comprehensive 3PL model.

Research methodology

The report uses a qualitative approach: grounded theory (literature review + data visualised in Tableau), action research (a plan currently running at TAMYCO), and phenomenological research (interviews with staff, customers and partners).

Observation

Real-world experience and events in operations.

Interviews

Focused on customers & stakeholders for the most objective perspective.

Survey

Staff surveys after each step of identifying symptom – problem – cause.

Business Model Canvas (condensed)

Value Propositions

Comprehensive logistics services, real-time tracking, gensets for refrigerated cargo, optimised cost, fast & reliable.

Key Partners

Shipping lines, manufacturers, traders, importers/exporters, other logistics firms, ports, truckers, customs brokers.

Revenue Streams

Import-handling services, Ocean Freight, Air Freight, value-added services.

Appendix · Data Tables

Data appendix & industry benchmarks

The source data tables used to build the dashboards above, alongside reference carrier benchmarks (Statista, Alphaliner, Maritime Analytica).

Table 1 · CRR CRR by segment — all markets & USA–Canada Click a button to switch the data table
Table
Benchmark · Industry CRR TAMYCO’s CRR vs industry benchmark Figure 8 · explodingtopics.com
The service industry generally should reach >67%; the all-industry average is 75%. Even in the peak logistics boom year, TAMYCO’s CRR stayed below expectations — and the 2021–2022 period fell well under the threshold.